(1) The provisions of this section are nonexclusive and in no way limit the effect or applicability of section 18-15-102.
(2) In any prosecution under section 18-15-102, if it is shown that the factors
enumerated in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection (2) were present in
connection with the making of the extension of credit in question, there shall arise a
presumption that the extension of credit was extortionate:
(a) The extension of credit was made with a loan finance charge in excess of
that established for criminal usury.
(b) At the time credit was extended, the debtor reasonably believed that one
or more extensions of credit by the creditor had been collected or attempted to be
collected by extortionate means or the nonrepayment thereof had been punished
by extortionate means.
(c) Upon the making of the extension of credit, the total of the extensions of
credit by the creditor to the debtor then outstanding, including any unpaid interest
or similar charges, exceeded one hundred dollars.
(3) In any prosecution under section 18-15-102, evidence of similar offenses
tending to establish the existence of a plan, scheme, or design on the part of the
defendant to produce a result of which the act charged is a part shall be admissible
in evidence against the defendant. Such evidence of similar offenses, if known to
the debtor, shall also be admissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing the
reasonable belief of the debtor referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this
section.
(4) Whether evidence introduced under the provisions of subsection (2) of
this section giving rise to the presumption that the extension of credit was
extortionate is sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt, if such evidence is not disputed, is a question to be determined
by the jury under proper instructions or by the court if no jury trial is had. Where
there is evidence tending to show the innocence of the transaction, the issue of
whether the extension of credit was extortionate shall be submitted to the jury, if
trial is to a jury, unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly
negates the presumed offense.
L. 72: p. 289, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-15-103.
